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UNDER THE GUN: WILL STATES’ ONE-GUN-PER-MONTH LAWS PASS CONSTITUTIONAL 
MUSTER AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD? 
 




 In the early morning hours of December 12, 2011, New York City police officers 
responded to a reported robbery taking place in a Brooklyn basement.
1
 Unbeknownst to the 
officers, the robbers were still in the basement, hiding in the shadows behind them.
2
 The robbers, 
attempting to evade the officers, tried to slip away unnoticed through a back door.
3
 They were 
met, however, by two other police officers at the door who had just arrived to provide backup 
support to the officers at the scene.
4
  Surprised at the sight of the two additional officers, one the 
robbers took out his gun and shot Officer Peter Figoski in the face.
5
 Officer Figoski later died in 
the hospital.
6




This is not at all uncommon in New York City, where 85% of the guns used in crimes come 
from out-of-state, and 90% of those guns are illegal.
8
 According to the office of Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, Virginia is the number one exporter of guns that are used in commission of crimes in 
New York City, and one of the “top suppliers nationally.”9 Thus, it was distressing to many, 
including Mayor Bloomberg, when Governor Bob McDonnell of Virginia announced that the 
                                                 
1 Michael Wilson, In Dark Brooklyn Doorway, Officer Confronts Gunman, and Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at 
A1.  





7 Tina Moore & Bill Hutchinson, Mayor Bloomberg criticizes Virginia repeal of 20-year-old gun law, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayor-bloomberg-criticizes-virginia-repeal-20-year-
old-gun-law-article-1.1031149.  
8 Kirsten Gillibrand, End the Flow of Illegal Guns, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-kirsten-gillibrand/end-the-flow-of-illegal-g_b_2440791.html.  
9 Moore and Hutchinson, supra note 7.  
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state was repealing its one-gun-per-month law in March of 2012.
10
 One-gun-per-month laws 
seek to prevent the export of guns from states with weaker firearms regulations to states with 
stricter firearms regulations through the means of a “straw” purchaser who buys guns in bulk and 
then resells them on the street.
11
 The law does so by limiting the number of guns that an 
individual may purchase to one every thirty days.
12
  





 and, most recently, New Jersey have enacted their own versions of one-gun-per-
month laws in order to combat the illegal transfer of firearms.
15
 Studies indicate that one-gun-
per-month laws, where implemented, have been successful in reducing interstate firearms 
trafficking.
16
 Governor McDonnell and other gun rights advocates, however, argue that these 
laws unconstitutionally burden citizens’ Second Amendment right to bear arms, a right which 
was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller
17
 in 2008 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010.
18
 As a result of Heller and McDonald, much of the 
existing state gun control legislation in the United States has been called into question.
19
 Lower 
courts have upheld a wide variety of gun control laws, such as felon-in-possession bans and bans 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca C. Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate Transfer of Firearms, 
JAMA 1759, 1759-60 (1996).  
12 Id. 
13 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2011). 
14 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26835(f), 27535(a) (West 2012). 
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2, 2C:58-3 (West 2011).  
16 Weil & Knox, supra note 11, at 1759-61; Christopher S. Koper, Crime Gun Risks Factors: Buyer, Seller, Firearm, 
and the Transaction Characteristics Associated with Gun Trafficking and Criminal Gun Use: Report to the National 
Institute of Justice, Philadelphia, PA: Jerry Lee Center of Criminology (2007): 1-96, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221074.pdf.  
17 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
18 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  
19 Adam Winkler, The New Second Amendment: A Bark Worse Than Its Right, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-new-second-amendment_b_154783.html. 
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on carrying weapons in sensitive places, without much difficulty.
20
 However, neither Heller nor 
McDonald provided guidance to lower courts on how they should evaluate gun control laws, and 
so the future of gun control legislation remains unclear until the Supreme Court articulates a 
standard of review for implementing the Second Amendment. 
After a brief examination of the history of Second Amendment jurisprudence in the United 
States in Part I, Part II of this Note will address the Supreme Court decisions in Heller and 
McDonald. In Part III, this Note will analyze how lower courts have addressed constitutional 
claims against gun control laws in the wake of Heller and McDonald and in the absence of 
guidance from the Supreme Court on what standard of review to apply. Finally, in Part IV this 
Note will conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard under which Second 
Amendment challenges to gun control laws should be reviewed, and, under this standard, one-
gun-per-month laws pass constitutional muster. 
 
PART I: HISTORY OF SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO HELLER AND 
MCDONALD: AN INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE RIGHT? 
 
 The recent push for passage of gun control laws as a response to increasing concern over 
gun-related violence, coupled with the backlash from gun right advocates, has pushed the 
disagreement about the scope of the Second Amendment to the fore where, today, it is a source 
of particular contention that can hardly be ignored.
21
 However, it was not always the case that the 
Second Amendment was a source of hotly contested debate.
22
 Indeed, prior to the Heller and 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1168 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); United States v. Masciandaro, 
638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).  
21 Id.  
22 Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002).  
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McDonald era, the Second Amendment was a “relatively obscure constitutional provision” that 
“attracted little judicial or scholarly attention.”23 
The debate surrounding the Second Amendment has historically focused on whether it 
protects an individual right to “keep and bear arms,” or whether it merely protects a collective 
right of state militia to maintain firearms “free from federal interference.”24 Three basic schools 
of thought have emerged: (1) the “traditional individual right” model, (2) the “limited individual 
right” model, and (3) the “collective right” model.25 Proponents of the “traditional individual 
right” model contend that the Second Amendment guarantees individual private citizens a 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms for any purpose. 
26
 The second view holds that 
individuals have a constitutional right to possess firearms when it is “reasonably related” to 
militia service.
27
  The third approach asserts that the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
guarantees only the right of the people to maintain state militias, and does not confer any 
individual right to keep and maintain firearms.
28
 Prior to the decision handed down by the 
Supreme Court in Heller, the dominant view of the Second Amendment, and the one most 
widely accepted by lower courts, was the “collective right” model, and it was not until recently 
that this view came under increasing attack by advocates of the individual right theory.
29
 There 
was, however, no Supreme Court-endorsed view of the Second Amendment, and the lower 
courts were left to themselves to determine the scope of the right to bear arms.
30
 
                                                 
23 Id.  
24 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 684 (2007). 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
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 In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court limited its analysis of the Second 
Amendment simply to say that it was not applicable to state or local governments.
31
 In United 
States v. Cruikshank, the Court dismissed criminal charges brought against two men who 
allegedly denied their fellow citizens their right to “bear[] arms for a lawful purpose.”32 More 
importantly, the Court announced that the Second Amendment “means no more than it shall not 
be infringed by Congress, [and] has no other effect than to restrict the power of the national 
government.”33 Then, eleven years later in Presser v. Illinois, the Supreme Court affirmed its 
decision in Cruikshank, and upheld an Illinois ban against citizen participation in an 
“unauthorized militia.”34 Not until 1939 did the Second Amendment receive any extensive 
treatment by the Supreme Court, and still it was nothing more than a “cryptic discussion” of the 
scope of the right to bear arms.
35
 In United States v. Miller, the Court considered a Second 
Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934, which prohibited the transportation 
of unregistered short-barreled shotguns over state lines.
36
 Because there was no evidence that the 
short-barreled shotgun was “any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could 
contribute to the common defense,” the Second Amendment did not guarantee the right to 
possess such a firearm.
37
 In so holding, the Supreme Court went on to conclude that the right to 
bear arms must have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia,” with the “obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the 
                                                 
31 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).  
32 Id. at 542, 556-67.  
33 Id. at 542.  
34 116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886). The Court also noted that the ban would not have violated the Second Amendment 
even if it did apply to the states. Id.  
35 Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060.  
36 307 U.S. 174, 175-76 (1939).  
37 Id. at 178.  
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effectiveness” of the power of Congress to raise a militia.38 The Second Amendment, the Court 
said, “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”39 Thus, in the years that followed 
Miller, a majority of lower courts used the decision to support the collective right view of the 
Second Amendment and uphold various gun control measures.
40
  
The Supreme Court did not reference the scope of the Second Amendment again until 
1980 in Lewis v. United States, where it noted, in a footnote dismissing a Second Amendment 
challenge to the federal felon-in-possession ban, that federal gun control laws such as the one at 
issue, did not “trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties,” and it cited Miller to support 
its view.
41
 The Court summarized Miller’s holding as protecting “no right to keep and bear a 
firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a 
well-regulated militia.’”42 Thus, similar to its decision in Miller, the Supreme Court in Lewis 
implicitly rejected the traditional individual right model in favor of the collective right view.
43
 
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the collective right view was 
called into question. A new wave of academic scholarship emerged that supported the individual 
right view of the Second Amendment, and it began to hold sway in a few lower courts.
44
 In 2001, 
the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted the traditional individual right approach, the first circuit court 
                                                 
38 Id.; accord U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have the Power  . . . To provide for calling forth 
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions . . . . ”) 
39 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.  
40 See, e.g., United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller to support its holding that a 
“federal criminal gun-control law does not violate the Second Amendment unless it impairs the state’s ability to 
maintain a well-regulated militia”); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
“Miller and its progeny do confirm that the Second Amendment establishes no right to possess a firearm apart from 
the role possession of the gun might play in maintaining a state militia”); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 
(3d Cir. 1996) (declaring that “the Miller Court  . . .  demanded a reasonable relationship between [a weapon’s] 
‘possession or use’ and militia-related activity” (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178)).  
41 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).  
42 Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).  
43 Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1061-62. 
44 Id.; see also Winkler, supra note 24, at 684 (noting that a number of influential legal scholars have criticized the 
collective right view and endorsed the individual right theory).  
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to do so.
45
 In United States v. Emerson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for personal use.46 It 
held that “[t]he plain meaning of the right to keep arms is that it is an individual, rather than a 
collective, right and is not limited to keeping arms while engaged in active military service.”47 
Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit Court struck down a gun 
control law because it violated the Second Amendment, finding that the Amendment conferred 
an individual right to bear arms in Parker v. District of Columbia (renamed District of Columbia 
v. Heller upon appeal to the Supreme Court).
48
 This case would later prove to be the impetus that 
drove the Supreme Court to deal with the Second Amendment directly and formally announce its 
view of the scope of the Amendment. 
 
PART II: HELLER AND MCDONALD ESTABLISH AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS IN THE HOME FOR SELF-DEFENSE 
 
Like the District of Columbia Circuit Court below, the Supreme Court adopted the 
individual right approach when it struck down the District of Columbia gun regulation in 
Heller.
49
 The law was one that, in the Court’s words, “totally ban[ned] handgun possession. . . .  
[and] amount[ed] to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by 
American society for [the] lawful purpose [of self-defense],”  which is an “inherent right. . . . 
central to the Second Amendment . . . .”50 To be sure, the law was one of the most restrictive gun 
                                                 
45 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001).  
46 Id. at 259-60. It should be noted that the court nevertheless upheld the gun control law at issue, a ban on 
possession by domestic violence misdemeanants.  
47 Id. at 232. 
48 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
49 554 U.S. at 635. 
50 Id. at 626-27.  
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control measures in the country.
51
 It banned possession of handguns and required all other 
firearms to be kept in the home where they had to be trigger-locked or disassembled.
52
 The 
Supreme Court, after conducting a lengthy inquiry into the construction of the text of the Second 
Amendment and its historical context, concluded that it “conferred an individual right to keep 
and bear arms,”53 and this right extends to “all Americans,” not just members of a militia.54 
Therefore, the Court held, all citizens must be able to keep and use firearms “for the core lawful 
purpose of self-defense.”55 Because the home is “where the need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute,” the District of Columbia’s “absolute prohibition of handguns held and 
used for self-defense in the home” was unconstitutional.56 With this, the Supreme Court 
explicitly endorsed the individual right view of the Second Amendment.   
Nevertheless, the Court was careful to clarify that its holding in Heller did not invalidate 
the numerous gun control laws already in place.
57
 The Second Amendment, the Court 
emphasized, is “not unlimited” and is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”58 The Court provided a list of various gun 
control regulations—called by some scholars the “Heller safe harbor”—that do not infringe on 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms.
59
 Taking a historical approach, the Court noted that 
most nineteenth century courts held concealed carry laws valid under the Second Amendment or 
                                                 
51 Id. at 629 (commenting that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of 
the District’s handgun ban”).  
52 Id. at 635. 
53 Id. at 595. 
54 Id. at 581. 
55 Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
56 Id. at 636.  
57 Id. at 626. 
58 Id. 
59 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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state constitutions.
60
 Those holdings would not be called into question because of the Court’s 
decision in Heller.
61
 Similarly, the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . .or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” were all 
presumptively lawful under the Second Amendment.
62
 The Court further qualified this list of 
exceptions by asserting that it merely provided “examples” of permissible regulations, and it was 
not meant to be “exhaustive.”63 
Two years later in McDonald, the Supreme Court again held that the Second Amendment 
guaranteed the individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense, and it 
further extended this right by applying it to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
64
  In McDonald, plaintiffs challenged a Chicago municipal law that 
banned individuals from possessing firearms unless they had a valid registration certificate.
65
 
The law prohibited the registration of most handguns, effectively banning handguns in the city.
66
 
The plaintiffs also challenged an Oak Park, Illinois, ban that held it “unlawful for any person to 
possess . . . any firearm.”67 The Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Heller that the Second 
Amendment is an individual right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense purposes.
68
 
The Court held that self-defense is a “basic right” recognized by our legal system, and self-
defense is the “central component” of the Second Amendment.69 The right to bear arms, the 
                                                 
60 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 626-27.  
63 Id. at 627 n.26.  
64 130 S. Ct. at 3026.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. (citing Chicago, Ill. Municipal Code § 8-20-050(c)). 
67 Id. (quoting Oak Park, Ill. Municipal Code § 27-2-1 (2007); 27-1-1 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
68 Id. at 3036. 
69 Id. 
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Court reasoned, is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions,”70 and is one that the 
Founding Fathers deemed important enough to warrant constitutional protection.
71
 Thus, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment right is a “fundamental” 
one, and, as such, the Amendment should be incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause and made applicable to the states.
72
  
However, the McDonald plurality, like the Heller majority, found that the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited, and its decision did not “cast doubt” on the constitutionality of the 
“longstanding regulatory measures” highlighted in Heller.73 Moreover, the plurality made clear 
that incorporation “does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”74 The plurality further noted 
that state and local experimentation with “reasonable firearms regulations” should continue.75 
Like Heller, McDonald focused on the right of handgun possession in the home. The McDonald 
Court noted that self-defense is “the central component of the Second Amendment right,” and it 
stressed that the need to exercise that right is “most acute” in the home to protect “self, family, 
and property.”76 
Perhaps just as important as what the Supreme Court said in Heller and McDonald is 
what it did not say. Although the Court finally adopted the individual right approach to the 
Second Amendment when it affirmed the individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the home 
                                                 
70 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
71 Id. at 3036-37. 
72 Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion). Though a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the Second Amendment 
applied to the states, the Court could not agree on which provision of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated it. 
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, held that the Due Process Clause incorporated the Second Amendment. Id. 
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
made the Second Amendment applicable to the states. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment).  
73 Id. at 3047.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 3046.  
76 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628).  
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for self-defense purposes, it did little more than that.
77
 Neither Heller nor McDonald endorsed a 
standard of review that lower courts should use in evaluating gun control legislation.
78
 In the 
Heller majority opinion, Justice Scalia said only what level of scrutiny would not apply: rational 
basis review.
79
 Such a lenient standard, Justice Scalia noted, would be wholly inappropriate for a 
“specific, enumerated right” like the right to bear arms.80 Justice Scalia similarly rejected an 
“interest balancing” approach as inappropriate, an approach advocated by Justice Breyer in his 
dissent, which would weigh the individual’s right to bear arms with the state’s interest in 
promoting public safety.
81
 Instead, Justice Scalia simply stated that future challenges to gun 
control legislation will determine the scope of the Second Amendment and the standard of 
review that ought to apply.
82
 Similarly, in McDonald, the plurality rejected Justice Breyer’s 
“interest balancing” approach, but did not identify which standard of review ought to be used.83 
It said only that “reasonable” gun control legislation would be permissible.84  
Nevertheless, the impact of Heller and McDonald should not be underestimated. These 
cases have spawned an overwhelming number of Second Amendment lawsuits and legal claims 
since the Supreme Court handed them down, and the constitutionality of gun control laws 





                                                 
77 See id. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (rejecting an interest-balancing approach advocated by Justice Breyer in Heller, 
but declining to propose an alternative standard for reviewing gun control regulations); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 
634-36 (recognizing the dissent’s criticism that the majority did not settle on a standard of review for gun control 
regulations, but concluding that “since this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field.”).  
78 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-36.  
79 Id. at 628.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core 
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). 
82 Id. at 635.  
83Id.   
84 Id. at 3046.  
85 Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1199-1200 (2009). 
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PART III: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION POST-HELLER AND MCDONALD 
 
As noted above, gun advocates have initiated hundreds of lawsuits since Heller and 
McDonald, and lower courts have yet to settle on which standard of review is proper in 
reviewing Second Amendment challenges.
86
 While most courts have applied intermediate 
scrutiny,
87
 other courts have used strict scrutiny, a reasonableness standard, or even a hybrid of 
strict and intermediate scrutiny.
88
 However, while the review of gun control legislation has been 
inconsistent, the result has been the same: challenged gun control laws have almost always 




A. Gun Control Legislation in the Heller “Safe Harbor” 
 
The Supreme Court in Heller made clear that its decision did not call into question 
“longstanding prohibitions” on gun possession, such as those on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, laws banning guns in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, and laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale 
of firearms.
90
 Heller also explicitly approved of the “historical tradition of prohibiting the 
carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”91 As a result, challenges to the gun control laws 
that fit into Justice Scalia’s list of Heller exceptions have been easily dismissed by lower court 
judges, sometimes “with gusto.”92 For instance, a number of federal courts have upheld felon-in-
                                                 
86 See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 688-89 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “Heller has left in its wake a 
morass of conflicting lower court opinions regarding the proper analysis to apply to challenged firearms 
regulations”).  
87 See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, No. 5:10-CV-302 (CAR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *31 (M.D. 
Ga. Jan. 24, 2011) (“This Court joins the majority of other courts and concludes that intermediate scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard of scrutiny for this case.”); see also Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2010).  
88 Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, Am. Constitution Soc’y, The Standardless Second Amendment, 2-7 (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr%20and%C20Winkler%C20Standardless%C20Second%Amednment.pdf.  
89 Id.  
90 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
91 Id. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
92 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 59, at 1248. 
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possession bans in the wake of Heller.
93
 As one court that considered a challenge to the ban 
noted, “[t]here is no wiggle room to distinguish the present case from the Supreme Court’s 
blanket [presumptively lawful] statement.”94 Similarly, bans on possession by the mentally ill 
have survived Second Amendment challenges.
95
 The Heller Court’s approval of the tradition of 
prohibiting dangerous and unusual weapons has been cited when upholding a ban on assault 
weapons as well.
96
 So too has the Court’s endorsement of bans of firearms in “sensitive places” 
led lower courts to reject challenges to the Gun Free School Zone Act (“GFSZA”)97 and bans on 
possession of firearms at post offices.
98
 Recently, lower courts have expanded this “sensitive 






Lower courts have also upheld gun control measures not specifically mentioned in 
Heller, relying on a footnote in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion that cautions that his list of 
“presumptively lawful regulatory gun measures” was not meant to be “exhaustive,” but merely to 
provide examples of the types of laws that do not pose a challenge to the Second Amendment.
102
 
Courts have, for example, upheld bans on gun possession by illegal drug users because such bans 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 (2009); United 
States v. Bronson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Miller, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 1162, 1168 (W.D. Tenn. 2009). 
94 United States v. Schultz, No. 10:08-Cr-75-TS, 2009 Dist. LEXIS 234, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009).  
95 See, e.g., United States v. McRobie, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 617, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam) 
(rejecting a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which bans possession of firearms by individuals who have been 
committed to a mental institution).  
96 See Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 194-95 (holding that the District of Columbia’s firearms registration process, 
prohibition of assault weapons, and prohibition of large capacity ammunition feeding devices was constitutional 
following the majority’s opinion in Heller).  
97 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006); Denning & Reynolds, supra note 59, at 1252 (citing United States v. Lewis, No. 
2008-45, 2008 WL 5412012, at *2 (D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008)(where the court stated that “Heller unambiguously 
forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to the [GFSZA] under any level of scrutiny”)).  
98 Id. (citing United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2008 WL 2622996, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008)).  
99 Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2009).  
100 United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790-91 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d, No. 09-4839, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5964 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011).  
101 New York v. Ferguson, No. 2008QN036911, 2008 WL 4694552, at *4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008).  
102 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.  
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are the functional equivalent of felon-in-possession bans, which were explicitly mentioned in 
Heller as permissible.
103
 Other courts have found bans on possession by domestic violence 
misdemeanants constitutional, again reasoning that these individuals are analogous to felons, and 
so such bans are in line with the examples of “presumptively lawful” regulations in Heller.104 
 
B. Lower Courts Search for the Proper Standard of Review for Gun Control Legislation 
 
The line of cases above indicates that lower courts have overwhelmingly upheld gun 
control legislation. However, they have done so by employing different standards of review.
105
 A 
few courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have analyzed (and upheld) gun control laws without 
employing or endorsing any of the traditional constitutional standards of review.
106
 Nevertheless, 
most courts reviewing regulations have chosen to explicitly endorse a standard of review, but 
with varying results. Some have adopted strict scrutiny;
107
 a few others have applied a less 
conventional hybrid of strict and intermediate scrutiny review or a reasonableness test.
108
 The 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(3), prohibiting unlawful drug users from possessing guns, is constitutional); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 
919, 920 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1027 (2010).  
104 See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164-65 (D. Me. 2008) 
(holding that because domestic violence misdemeanants have been convicted of violent crimes, they ought to be 
added to the list of “’felons and mentally ill’ against whom ‘the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms’ survives Second Amendment scrutiny” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)).  
105 Denning & Reynolds, supra note 59, at 1253-54 (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 597 
(W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 958 (2011) (ban on purchasing weapons 
with obliterated serial numbers); LaRoche v. United States, Nos. CV407-54, CR402-234, 2008 WL 4222081, at *2 
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2008); United States v. Bledsoe, No. 8A-08-CR-13(2), 2008 WL 3538717, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 
Aug. 8, 2008) (rejecting a challenge to a straw-purchase ban); Mullinex v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154, 2008 WL 262017, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) (rejecting a challenge on an import 
restriction applied to a plaintiff’s attempt to import a German machine gun)).  
106 Skoein, 587 F.3d at 812-13 (stating that the court “need not get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ 
quagmire,” but ultimately applying intermediate scrutiny to review a ban on possession of firearms by individuals 
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors).  
107 See, e.g., United States v. Mantalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 WL 667229, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) 
(upholding a federal law banning individuals subject to a protective order from possessing guns as “narrowly 
tailored” to serve the “compelling government interest” of reducing domestic violence); United States v. Erwin, No. 
1:07-CR-556 (LEK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (same). 
108 See, e.g., Skoein, 614 F.3d at 642 (holding that for laws that “severely burden the core Second Amendment right 
of armed defense” in the home, strict scrutiny should be applied, but for laws that do not infringe on that core right, 
“intermediate scrutiny is appropriate”); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 09CV2371-
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A few courts have adopted strict scrutiny to review gun control regulations,
110
 but even 
these courts have upheld gun control legislation in every case.
111
 For instance, a federal district 
court faced with a challenge to a statute banning domestic violence misdemeanants from 
possessing guns employed strict scrutiny because “the Heller Court described the right to keep 
and bear arms as a fundamental right,” and “where fundamental rights are at stake, strict scrutiny 
is to be applied.”112 However, when it applied strict scrutiny, the court found a compelling 
government interest in the protection of domestic partners and children from gun violence.
113
 
Further, the ban was narrowly tailored to serve this interest because it covers only those 
individuals who had been “convicted of using or attempting to use physical force or threatening 
to use deadly force against present and past domestic partners and children” and because 
“various safeguards are established to ensure due process.”114 
A smaller number of courts have offered a hybrid of strict and intermediate scrutiny as 
the proper approach.
115
 A Seventh Circuit panel, in a decision later vacated, held that with 
                                                                                                                                                             
IEG (BGS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878, at *23-24 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (finding that “a majority of cases 
citing to McDonald and employing some form of heightened scrutiny . . . have employed intermediate scrutiny”); 
Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 604.  
109 See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.Org, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *31 (upholding a Georgia ban on possession of 
weapons in places of worship and stating that “[t]his Court joins the majority of other courts and concludes that 
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for this case”); Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 
09CV2371-IEG (BGS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878, at *23-24 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (noting that “a majority 
of cases citing to McDonald and employing some form of heightened scrutiny . . . have employed intermediate 
scrutiny”).  
110 See, e.g., Erwin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148, at *5-6 (holding a federal statute that banned individuals subject 
to a protective order from possessing guns was “narrowly tailored” to serve the “compelling government interest” of 
reducing domestic violence). 
111 See Erwin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78148, at *5-6; Montalvo, 2009 WL 667229, at *3; United States v. 
Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2009). 
112 Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.  
113 Id. at 1233.  
114 Id. at 1235.  
115 Chester, 628 F.3d at 680.  
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regulations that “severely burden the core Second Amendment right of armed defense” in the 
home, strict scrutiny is proper.
116
 But, for laws that do not burden this core right, intermediate 
scrutiny ought to be applied.
117
 The Fourth Circuit subsequently adopted this hybrid approach 
after the Seventh Circuit vacated its decision, holding in United States v. Chester that a domestic 
violence misdemeanant is not included in the protection of the “core right” in Heller because 
they are not “law-abiding citizens,” and so intermediate scrutiny ought to be applied to review 
the statute (which it ultimately upheld).
118
 
Still other courts have used a “reasonable regulation” standard to analyze gun control 
laws after Heller.
119
 These courts ask whether a law “effectively destroys or nullifies the ability 
of law-abiding people to possess a firearm for self-defense. If so, the law is unconstitutional; if 
not, the law is deemed to be only a regulation, not a prohibition.”120 However, at least one 
federal judge noted that because this standard is so deferential to legislatures, it could not be the 
standard intended by the Heller Court.
121
 A reasonableness test, according to that judge, “would 
subject the contested provisions to a more lenient measure of scrutiny than that envisioned by the 
Heller court,” and thus could not be applied post-Heller.122 
Though there is some variation, a majority of lower courts have employed intermediate 
scrutiny in evaluating challenges to gun control legislation, ruling out rational basis review and 
                                                 
116 Skoien, 587 F.3d at 812.  
117 Id. at 812-13. The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated this decision to use a hybrid approach and instead 
used intermediate scrutiny to uphold a ban on possession by domestic violence misdemeanants as substantially 
related to an important government interest. Id. at 642.  
118 Chester, 628 F.3d at 683. 
119 Mehr & Winkler, supra note 88, at 6-7.  
120 Id. 
121 Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 186.  
122 Id. (upholding a firearms registration scheme, a ban on assault weapons, and a ban on large capacity ammunition 
feeding devices under intermediate scrutiny).  
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strict scrutiny review.
123
 Strict scrutiny is improper, they reason, because the list of 
presumptively lawful regulations outlined in Heller is not consistent with strict scrutiny 
review.
124
 The District Court for the District of Columbia, for example, stated that strict scrutiny 
“would not square” with Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”125 Using 
this logic, the court in that case upheld the city’s firearms registration scheme.126 At the same 
time, these courts have also found rational basis review is improper because it is too lenient a 
standard for a right that a plurality of the Supreme Court has deemed a “fundamental” one. As 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, “some form of heightened scrutiny is necessary 
in light of the fact that the right at issue is a specific, constitutionally enumerated right.”127 The 
court reasoned that intermediate scrutiny struck the proper balance between the individual’s and 
the government’s interests, and using that standard of review it upheld a ban on possession of 
firearms in national parks.
128
 A large number of other courts have followed the reasoning of 




C. One-Gun-Per-Month Laws Pose a Unique Challenge to Courts 
 
                                                 
123 See GeorgiaCarry.Org, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *31 (upholding a Georgia ban on possession of weapons 
in places of worship and stating that “[t]his Court joins the majority of other courts and concludes that intermediate 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for this case”). 
124 See, e.g., Heller II, 698 F. Supp. at 187; see also GeorgiaCarry.Org, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370, at *31 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court’s description of a list of presumptively valid regulatory measures is at least implicitly inconsistent 
with strict scrutiny”); Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (finding that “the [Heller] Court’s willingness to presume 
the validity of several types of gun regulations is arguably inconsistent with the adoption of a strict scrutiny standard 
of review” and adopting intermediate scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality of a ban on purchasing guns with 
obliterated serial numbers). 
125 Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 187 (In upholding the ban, the court noted, “as we move outside the home, firearms 
rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests outweigh individual interests in self-
defense.”).  
126 Id. at 191. 
127 Id. 
128 Masciandaro, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964, at *34.  
129 Peruta, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878, at *23-24 (noting that “a majority of cases citing to McDonald and 
employing some form of heightened scrutiny…have employed intermediate scrutiny”).  
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 One-gun-per-month laws pose a significant challenge to lower courts attempting to 
analyze them under Heller and McDonald because they place a substantial restriction on the 
individual’s ability to exercise his right to bear arms by restricting the frequency with which he 
may lawfully purchase handguns. Nevertheless, an increasing number of states are enacting such 
laws. The first state to enact a law restricting the legal purchase of a handgun to one every thirty 
days was South Carolina in 1976 (which later repealed in 2004).
130
 Since then, four other states 
have passed similar laws: Virginia in 1993,
131
 Maryland in 1996,
132
 California in 2000,
133
 and 
New Jersey in 2010.
134
 Most recently, in 2009, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick 
introduced a one-gun-per-month law that would require a thirty-day waiting period for handgun 
purchases, but he extended it to include a waiting period for the purchase of rifles, shotguns, 
firearms, machine guns, large capacity weapons, and large capacity feeding devices as well.
135
 
The bill, however, failed to pass in the legislature before session’s end in July 2010.136  
 As noted in the Introduction, state legislatures have enacted one-gun-per-month laws to 
prevent the flow of guns from states with weaker firearms regulations to states with stricter 
firearms regulations.
137
 That is, the law seeks to target the “straw” purchaser who buys guns in 
bulk and then resells them illegally to individuals who otherwise could not purchase a gun 
legally under state law, such as criminals and minors. Opponents of one-gun-per-month laws, 
however, argue that they infringe on individuals’ Second Amendment right to bear arms by 
arbitrarily restricting the number of guns that they may purchase, by means that are otherwise 
                                                 
130 Act of May 19, 2004, 2004 S.C. Sess. Laws Act 242 (2004).  
131 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(P) (2009); 2012 Va. Acts ch. 37. 
132 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2011).  
133 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26835(f), 27535(a) (West 2012).  
134 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2, 2C:58-3 (West 2011).  
135 H.B. 4102 at § 7, 186th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2009).  
136 See H.B. 2012, Rule 12A, at 25, 186th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2009) (requiring that “all formal business 
of the second annual session…be concluded no later than the last day of July of that calendar year”).  
137 Weil & Knox, supra note 11, at 1759-60.  
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legal, in a thirty-day period.
138
 Just last year, the Virginia state legislature voted to repeal its own 
one-gun-per-month law, though it was one of the first states to enact such a law.
139
 Although 
one-gun-per-month laws have not been challenged in court, the constitutionality of these laws is 
an issue that is ripe for review in the wake of Heller and McDonald, and one that is likely to be 
raised in the coming years by litigants who ascribe broad meaning to the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions. 
 
PART III: ANALYSIS 
 
 Gun right advocates championed Heller and McDonald as landmark decisions that, once 
and for all, firmly entrenched the individual right to keep and bear arms in American 
jurisprudence. However, the effect of these decisions has been far more subdued. Lower courts 
have been wary to read Heller and McDonald so broadly as to invalidate much existing gun 
control legislation. Instead, lower court judges have cited to Heller’s list of “presumptively 
lawful” regulations and upheld challenged gun control laws without much difficulty.140 As courts 
are faced with challenges to regulations not mentioned in Heller’s safe harbor, however, they 
will be forced to establish a constitutional standard of review to adjudicate such cases. 
 This Part will first show that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review for 
gun control laws that do not infringe on the “core right” of the individual to keep and bear arms, 
as recognized in Heller and McDonald.
141
 Intermediate scrutiny provides the flexibility and 
ability for local experimentation that the Supreme Court envisioned for such laws, but it also 
acknowledges that mere rational basis review is insufficient for a specific, enumerated right. 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., Laura Vozzella, McDonnell signs bill lifting one-handgun-per-month limit, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
February 28, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/mcdonnell-signs-bill-lifting-one-
handgun-per-month-limit/2012/02/28/gIQAtT0kgR_blog.html.  
139 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(P) (2009); 2012 Va. Acts ch. 37.  
140 See discussion supra Part II.  
141 See infra Part III.A.  
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Then, this Part will evaluate one-gun-per-month laws under intermediate scrutiny and determine 




A. Intermediate Scrutiny is the Proper Standard of Review for Gun Control Legislation 
 
Rational basis review is too lenient a standard to apply to restrictions that impinge on a 
right that the Supreme Court recognizes not only to be a “specific, enumerated right,” but a 
“fundamental” one.143 Justice Scalia explicitly ruled out the rational basis approach to Second 
Amendment cases in the Heller majority opinion: “[o]bviously, the [rational basis] test could not 
be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be 
it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right 
to keep and bear arms.”144 Thus, it does not provide the heightened standard of scrutiny that 
Heller appears to require. As one federal judge noted, it is doubtful that the Heller majority 
“envisioned [such a lenient standard] when it left for another day a determination of the level of 
scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.”145 
Similarly, strict scrutiny is also inadequate standard for evaluating Second Amendment 
challenges. It is true that in Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court did not explicitly rule out 
strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review like it did rational basis review.
146
 However, the 
Court seems to have at least implicitly ruled out strict scrutiny as the proper approach to these 
laws for a number of reasons. For one, the “presumptively lawful” gun control regulations in the 
Heller “safe harbor” would likely be found unconstitutional if a court were to apply strict 
scrutiny, which requires not only that the law in question serves a “compelling government 
                                                 
142 See infra Part III.B.  
143 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (plurality opinion). 
144 Id. 
145 Heller II, 698 F. Supp.2d at 187. 
146 See discussion infra Part II.  
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interest,” but also that the law is “narrowly tailored” to that interest.147  These regulations 
undoubtedly seek to preserve public safety, an interest that the Supreme Court has found 
“compelling.”148 However, a court would likely find that they do not satisfy the narrow tailoring 
requirement of the strict scrutiny test. For instance, at least one federal judge noted that felon-in-
possession bans are “wildly overinclusive” because they include both violent and non-violent 
felons.
149
 Yet, felon-in-possession bans are a category of regulations that Heller explicitly named 
to be presumptively lawful.
150
 
It is also important to note that in both Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court 
indicated not only that its holdings were not meant to disturb longstanding gun control 
regulations, but that it did not wish to hinder the ability of lawmakers to create other reasonable 
regulations.
151
 In the past, the Supreme Court has described strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact” to laws analyzed under the standard. 152  This would seem to suggest that the 
Supreme Court meant for gun control regulations to be scrutinized under a more flexible 
standard of review in order to keep with its statement that its holdings in Heller and McDonald 
“[do] not imperil every law regulating firearms.”153 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted, “[w]ere we 
to require strict scrutiny in circumstances such as those presented here [a challenge to a law 
banning possession of loaded guns in cars in national parks], we would likely foreclose an 
extraordinary number of regulatory measures, thus handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent [ ] 
                                                 
147 Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that under strict scrutiny, the constitutionality of Heller’s 
presumptively lawful regulations “would be far from clear”); Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (noting that “the 
Court’s willingness to presume the validity of several types of gun regulations is arguably inconsistent with the 
adoption of strict scrutiny standard of review”); Henigan, supra note 25, at 1197-98 (2009) (stating that “the Heller 
majority . . . implicitly rejected strict scrutiny” when it described gun control regulations that are presumptively 
lawful).  
148 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987) (stating that “the Government’s general interest in 
preventing crime is compelling” and may outweigh “the individual’s strong interest in liberty”). 
149 Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685.  
150 See discussion infra Part II.  
151 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.  
152 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).  
153 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).  
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armed mayhem’ in public places and depriving them of ‘a variety of tools for combating that 
problem.’”154 In these circumstances, intermediate scrutiny provides a better fit.  
Lastly, the Court in Heller determined that the right to bear arms is an “enumerated 
right,” and most other “enumerated” rights are not analyzed under strict scrutiny.155 As Professor 
Adam Winkler notes, “strict scrutiny is quite rarely applied to laws burdening the textually 
guaranteed rights found in the Bill of Rights.”156  It matters not that the McDonald plurality 
referred to the right to bear arms as “fundamental” when it incorporated it, for although “all 
incorporated rights may be fundamental . . . not all incorporated rights trigger strict scrutiny . . . . 
Strict scrutiny is only used in doctrines of two incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights: the 
First and Fifth Amendments.”157 Strict scrutiny is not employed, for example, when analyzing 
claims under the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
158
 or the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
159
  In addition, the Second Amendment lacks the absolute 
language that we find in the First Amendment, which does employ strict scrutiny in certain 
circumstances: “Congress shall make no law. . . ”160 Instead, the Court in Heller made clear that 
the right to bear arms “is not unlimited,” and it is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever for whatever purpose.”161 Thus, it seems unlikely that the 
Second Amendment requires strict scrutiny analysis where there is no “strict” language like that 
found in the First Amendment. 
In sum, intermediate scrutiny provides the heightened level of review for such a 
fundamental right, as required by Heller, but it is not so restrictive as to invalidate those 
                                                 
154 Masciandaro, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964, at *34 (citations omitted).  
155 Winkler, supra note 24, at 696.  
156 Id.  
157 Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 233 (2006).  
158 Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).  
159 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
160 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
161 554 U.S. at 626. 
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“presumptively lawful” regulations that Heller expressly endorses. These presumptively lawful 
regulations would likely survive intermediate scrutiny. Promoting public safety is undoubtedly 
an important government interest (indeed, as noted above, the Supreme Court has found it to be a 
“compelling” interest),162 and courts will likely find regulations like those in the Heller safe 





B. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny, One-Gun-Per-Month Laws Pass Constitutional Muster 
 
State legislatures have enacted one-gun-per-month laws to reduce the number of guns 
that enter the illegal firearms market and, more generally, to restrict the flow of interstate 
firearms trafficking.
164
 Much of the legislation aimed at illegal firearms trafficking has focused 
on handguns, like one-gun-per-month laws.
165
 Illegal firearms trafficking across state lines is a 
serious problem in the United States, in part because firearms sales are regulated at the state 
level; there is no federal law that limits the number of handguns that an individual may purchase 
at one time.
166
 States that have weaker firearms laws attract traffickers, who may make multiple 
purchases of guns and then resell them in states with stricter firearms laws.
167
 Multiple gun sales 
are of particular concern, for studies have shown that handguns sold in multiple sales to a single 
purchaser are the type of weapon most frequently used in the commission of crimes.
168
 
                                                 
162 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-51.  
163 Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (noting that under intermediate scrutiny, “the degree of fit between [the gun 
control regulation] in this case and the well-established goal of promoting public safety need not be perfect; it must 
only be substantial.”).  
164 Regulating Guns in America: An Evaluation and Comparative Analysis of Federal, State, and Selected Local 
Gun Laws, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 139 (2008), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/01/RegGens.entire.report.pdf.  
165 Regulating Guns in America, supra note 161, at 139. 
166 Weil & Knox, supra note 11, at 1759-60.  
167 Id. 
168 See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Youth Crime Gun Interdiction 
Initiative, Crime Gun Trace Reports (2000) National Report 50 (July 2002); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
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Furthermore, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms found in 2000 that 20% of all 
retail handguns recovered in crimes were purchased as part of a multiple sale.
169
 Thus, one-gun-
per-month laws seek to rectify a real problem that contributes to gun-related violence 
nationwide. 
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, it is unclear what level of scrutiny judges ought to 
apply should one-gun-per-month laws be challenged in court. The Supreme Court, as noted 
above, has made clear that mere rational basis review would be inappropriate for such 
legislation.
170
 In order for one-gun-per-month laws to pass constitutional muster, then, they must, 
at a minimum, serve an important government interest and be substantially related to achieving 
that interest. It is unlikely that one-gun-per-month laws, like the other presumptively lawful gun 
control regulations, would survive strict scrutiny.
171
 A court would most likely find, using strict 
scrutiny analysis, that although these laws seek to serve a compelling government interest (that 
is, protecting public safety), they fail the “narrow tailoring” requirement.  
However, as this Note has indicated, strict scrutiny is not the proper standard to apply to 
gun control legislation like one-gun-per-month laws. Instead, courts faced with challenges to the 
constitutionality of one-gun-per-month laws should use intermediate scrutiny analysis. That is, 
these laws need only serve an important government interest and to be substantially related to 
that interest.
172
 There are certainly a number of important government interests associated with 
limiting the right to bear arms, the most substantial of which is the interest in preserving public 
                                                                                                                                                             
Firearms, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative, Crime Gun Trace Reports (1999) 
National Report 40 (Nov. 2000).  
169 Id. at 50. 
170 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.  
171 See id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that under strict scrutiny, the constitutionality of Heller’s “safe 
harbor” regulations “would be far from clear”).  
172 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To pass constitutional muster under 
intermediate scrutiny, the government has the burden of demonstrating that its objective is an important one and that 
its objective is advanced by means substantially related to that objective.”).  
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safety and preventing violence.
173
 Studies have shown that gun violence is indeed a major 
problem in the United States—in 2010, it was estimated that someone dies by gun violence every 
seventeen minutes and over 70,000 Americans are shot non-fatally every year.
174
 One-gun-per-
month laws seek to remedy this problem by stemming the illegal flow of handguns into the hands 
of potential criminals. A court would therefore have little trouble finding that one-gun-per-month 
laws serve an important government interest.  
It is the next step of the inquiry—whether the laws are substantially related to that 
government interest—that requires a bit more analysis. Research shows that one-gun-per-month 
laws have been effective where enacted.
175
 Though now repealed, Virginia’s one-gun-per-month 
law provides a useful case study: the state adopted its one-gun-per-month law in 1993 after 
studies indicated that it was a “primary source” of guns recovered from crime scenes in the 
northeastern United States.
176
 After the law was adopted, the number of guns traced to Virginia 
dealers dropped by 71% in New York, 72% in Massachusetts, and 66% in New Jersey, New 
York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts combined.
177
 To be sure, such research is 
not conclusive, but intermediate scrutiny only requires that the law substantially achieve its 
intended goal, not that it is a perfect fit. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that in states with more urban areas where gun 
violence is a significant problem, the “substantial” relationship between one-gun-per-month laws 
                                                 
173 See, e.g., id. at 693 (“In this case, the government’s stated objective is to keep firearms out of the hands of violent 
felons, who the government believes are often those most likely to misuse firearms.”).  
174 National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Overall Firearm 
Gunshot Nonfatal Injuries and Rates per 100,000 (2010), available at http://webappa.cdc.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe. 
175 Weil & Knox, supra note 11, at 1759-61; Christopher S. Koper, Crime Gun Risk Factors: Buyer, Seller, Firearm, 
and the Transaction Characteristics Associated with Gun Trafficking and Criminal Gun Use: Report to the National 
Institute of Justice, Philadelphia, PA: Jerry Lee Center of Criminology (2007): 1-96, available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221074.pdf.  
176 Id. 
177 Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca Knox, Evaluating the Impact of Virginia’s One-Gun-A-Month Law, The Center to 
Prevent Handgun Violence 1, 4-6 (Aug. 1995).  Virginia repealed its one-gun-per-month law this year due in large 
part to heavy lobbying efforts by the firearms industry and the National Rifle Association. 
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and promoting public safety may be more readily clear than in states with fewer urban areas. 
Thus, a New Jersey court could find that such a relationship exists, whereas an Alaska court may 
not. Justice Alito, writing for the plurality in McDonald, encouraged consideration of “local 
needs and values” when evaluating state and local gun control laws.178 Intermediate scrutiny 
provides the flexibility to allow courts to consider these local factors in order to determine 
whether one-gun-per-month laws provide the substantial fit needed to serve the interest in 
preventing gun violence in the particular jurisdiction. 
 
PART IV: CONCLUSION 
 
For nearly 200 hundred years, the right to bear arms was one that was ill defined and on 
which the Supreme Court had failed to take an affirmative stance. At long last, with the Heller 
and McDonald decisions in 2008 and 2010, the Court took an affirmative stance and defined the 
Second Amendment: the right of an individual to keep and bear arms in the home for self-
defense purposes. Initially, gun rights advocates heralded Heller and McDonald as “landmark” 
decisions.  However, because the Court cautioned that the Second Amendment is “not unlimited” 
and refused to invalidate “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” gun control regulations, it 
is unclear how far this right to keep and bear arms extends. Since Heller and McDonald, 
hundreds of cases have been brought at the state and federal level to challenge gun control 
legislation, and there has been no consensus on how the courts ought to evaluate these laws.  
This Note proposes that intermediate scrutiny should be the standard that guides courts in 
reviewing gun control laws that regulate the right to keep and bear arms. Rational basis is too 
lenient a standard for a right that the Supreme Court has named to be an enumerated, 
                                                 
178 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046 (plurality opinion) (noting that incorporating the Second Amendment to apply to 
the states “limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local 
needs and values”).  
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fundamental right. On the other hand, strict scrutiny is inappropriate for a right that the Supreme 
Court has also said is “not unlimited” and not immune to regulation by federal and state gun 
control laws. Intermediate scrutiny strikes the proper balance: it provides the heightened level of 
review that is necessary to protect individuals’ interests in this fundamental right, but it also 
allows the government to protect its own interest in promoting public safety and reducing gun-
related violence. Under intermediate scrutiny, many gun control regulations that seek to promote 
these government interests, such as one-gun-per-month laws, would pass constitutional muster.  
When the Supreme Court does decide to address the difficult issue of which standard of review 
to apply to Second Amendment questions, it should keep in mind not only the interests of the 
individuals who wish to keep and bear arms, but the interests of the government in promoting 
public safety as well. 
In the coming years, lower courts are likely to continue to disagree on what level of 
scrutiny ought to be applied in Second Amendment cases. Though litigation will help to refine 
the scope and limits of the Second Amendment right to bear arms, until the Supreme Court 
decides to rule definitively on it, the fate of gun control regulations in the United States remains 
unclear.  
 
